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Catalaunian Fields AD 451: Rome's last great battle (Campaign), by Simon MacDowall
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The battle of the Catalaunian Fields saw two massive, powerful Empires square up in a conflict that was to shape the course of Eurasian history forever. For despite the Roman victory, the Roman Empire would not survive more than fifteen years afterward, while the Huns, shattered and demoralized, would meet their downfall against a coalition of German tribes soon after. This book, using revealing bird's-eye views of the plains of Champagne and detailed illustrations of the opposing warriors in the midst of desperate combat, describes the fighting at Chalons and reveals the broader campaign of Hunnic incursion that led up to it. Drawing on the latest research, Simon MacDowall reveals the shocking intensity and appalling casualties of the battle, while assessing the wider significance and consequences of the campaign.
- Sales Rank: #147118 in Books
- Brand: Campaign Series - Ancients Up to 500 A.D.
- Published on: 2015-09-22
- Released on: 2015-09-22
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.88" h x .32" w x 7.31" l, .81 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 96 pages
About the Author
Simon MacDowall is a former army officer with a deep interest in military history, especially the period around the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. After 22 years in the Canadian army he worked for several years on NATO International Staff and is now a Senior Civil Servant in the British Government. His combination of practical military background with his knowledge and understanding of the later Roman give him a unique perspective on the military aspects of the fascinating era. After living in Canada, Germany and Belgium, and seeing service in Central America, Bosnia and Kosovo, Simon now lives in London. The author lives in Suffolk, UK.
Most helpful customer reviews
20 of 20 people found the following review helpful.
Good overview of “last great battle”, despite a few glitches
By JPS
This is a good overview of the campaign leading “Rome’s last great battle” – that of the Catalaunian Fields which opposed the armies of Attila and Aetius, despite a number of glitches, shortcuts and simplifications.
First of all, the author is careful to state upfront that “for such an important battle, very little is known about it for certain.” He also briefly mentions, quite correctly, and in the very same paragraph, to what extent the written sources are limited, “patchy”, to use his own expression, and even deficient. The main source is Jordanes. This author’s account is rather biased, and even pro-Gothic propaganda at times, to such an extent that he only tells one part of the battle of the Catalaunian Fields, the part where the Visigoths and Ostrogoths are involved. The consequence, as the author mentions, is that one needs more than the usual amount of conjecture, hypothesis and speculation to try to develop a narrative that makes sense of what happened during both the campaign and the battle.
The section on the origins of the campaign is a decent one. The main points are made, but there are also a number of glitches or, more accurately perhaps, simplifications and questionable statements.
The first of these is the author belief that, by AD 451, “whatever remained of the Roman forces in Gaul had been run down or ignored for a generation”, with Simon McDowall going as far as stating that Aetius relied “almost exclusively” on Huns and Alans for his army. This seems to be a bit of an exaggeration, to put it mildly, and a simplification on several counts.
As several authors have discussed over the past fifty years (the point was first - and very well - made by AHM Jones in 1964, at least in English), the Roman army in Gaul suffered grievous losses over the first two decades or so of the fifth century. This appears from the so-called List of Dignities which, for the Western Empire, contains a list of military units established in the 420s for the Gallic Comitatenses army. Many of these (about 40% of them) are either regiments bearing the name of Emperor Honorius or upgraded frontiers units.
This shows both the scope of the losses sustained and the emergency measures taken to fill-in the gaps in a hurry. In addition, most if not all of the new units and of the surviving units are more than likely to have been significantly understrength because of difficulties in recruitment and almost constant campaigning between AD 407 and AD 422. The first date corresponds to the major breach of the Rhine frontier by the coalition of Vandals, Sueves and Alans, on the one hand, and the military coup and usurpation of Constantine at the head of the Roman Army of Britain and whatever Gallic and “barbarian” troops he managed to rally around him. The second date corresponds to the death of Constantius III who is the most likely candidate for most of this reorganisation and for the creation of the new units.
Whether the Gallic field army was run down, and to what extent, by the time Aetius became its general (AD 425), is very arguable. This is because there had been a considerable effort over perhaps as much as a decade - roughly between AD 411 and the death of Constantius III - to rebuild it. Unfortunately, we know very little about this effort, but we know that it existed given the number of new units created during the reign of Honorius or upgraded to the field army. Rather than having run down the field army in Gaul, it seems, on the contrary, that Constantius III did his utmost to rebuild it.
Another strange claim which is worth examining in much more detail than the author has done is the idea that between AD 425 and AD 451 – roughly a generation, the Gallic field army would have been “run down or ignored” by Aetius presumably because he preferred relying on his Hunnic and Alanic cavalry. This is most unlikely. One fails to see what motivation could have underpinned such a curious choice since during his whole tenure as general commanding the Roman field army in Gaul and the Roman forces in the Western Empire more generally, Aetius would have on the contrary needed every soldier he could get his hands on. The idea that Aetius would have instead relied “almost exclusively” on Hunnic and Alan cavalry instead does not make sense and is even implicitly contradicted by the author himself in his narrative.
Aetius certainly relied heavily on Hun and Alan cavalry. These probably constituted a large proportion of his buccellari bodyguard and perhaps even a large part of his shock troops. However, they could never have made up more than a few thousand horsemen and they came in addition to “Roman” (meaning Roman trained and equipped) cavalry and infantry, even if many of which could have been of Germanic descent. Things might have become more difficult for Aetius and his field army from AD 439 onwards, after the loss of Africa to the Vandals and the heavy defeat of Littorius by the Goths. The loss of Africa, which may have made up as much as a third of the Empire’s income, led to a financial crisis to the extent that the Empire was bankrupt by AD 443. The defeat of Littorius, one of Aetius’ trusted commanders, saw this general fall in battle together with a large number of hard to replace Hunnic cavalry. The death of Bleda in AD 445, which left Attila as sole ruler of the Huns and free to expand, would have reduced Aetius’ supply of Hunnic mercenaries to a trickle.
Despite all this, Aetius, according to Simon MacDowall, seems to have been able to field some 15000 to 20000 Romans for the battle and this was achieved, according to the author. This was achieved without drawing extensively on the praesental army of Italy which mostly remained in the peninsula. The source quoted by the author does show, however, that in addition to his own buccellari, several units probably crack auxilia palatina infantry regiments and perhaps also some cavalry accompanied Aetius when he came back to Gaul in a hurry after having learned of the Attila’s invasion. Here again, by assuming that the force accompanying him in his journey from Italy only totalled a thousand men, the author choses to minimise the size of this force, perhaps considerably. The size of Aetius’ buccellari bodyguard could perhaps have reached such a number on its own, although this might be a maximum. The size of each auxilia is unknown. It must have varied from unit to unit (as opposed to the five hundred apiece mentioned by the author). It could be anything between a couple of hundred men for a badly understrength unit to three or four time more. The point here is that the crack forces that Aetius brought with him from Italy to bolster his field army in Gaul could easily have included three or four thousand soldiers and a mix of cavalry and infantry while still leaving the bulk of the praesental army in Italy.
A related point is that of the quality and composition of Aetius’ “Roman” troops. The author dismisses the views of Elton according to which at this time the bulk of the Gallic field army was still made up of Roman troops (i.e. Roman trained). However, he also mentions that these troops, positioned on Aetius’ left wing, were able to withstand for hours the rather murderous arrow storms that the Huns inflicted on them and also withstand the Gepid and other Germanic assaults. To be able to do so without breaking (and they did not), at least part of these troops must have been well-equipped, well-trained and highly disciplined Roman infantry. In fact, the – rather gorgeous - double plate that makes up pages 70 and 71 shows exactly such a unit under attack from Hun horse archers.
Another related point is that of the size of the two opposing coalitions and the size of their main components. Here again, and as he did in his other Osprey campaign title on the battle of Adrianople some years ago, the author tends to adopt a “minimalist” approach, with numbers between twenty thousand and a bit less than forty thousand on each side. While the fantastic numbers that Jordanes comes up with – half a million for Attila’s army – are simply impossible, the lower end of the scale mentioned by the author seems too low, especially since it puts the Gepids and the Ostrogoths at only five thousand each, with these presumably also including contingents from numerous other Germanic allies of the Huns. On Aetius’ side, similar comments can be made for the Roman force, with ten thousand being too low especially if it also to include the buccellarii of Gallic landowners and a contingent of Armoricans. The same kind of comment tends to apply to the Alans, which the author tends to minimise and puts at anything from a thousand to three thousand.
However, all the rest of the title is considerably better and well told, with the main points being made, generally in a clear way.
The causes of the invasion are well laid out. One mild criticism is that the author could perhaps have better distinguished between the excuses and pretexts used by Attila to invade (claiming his “bride price” from the Emperor’s sister or wanting to put his Frankish prot�g� on the throne) from the real reasons, which are well presented. Interestingly, the author did not mention another of Attila’s pretexts which was to claim over-lordship over the Visigoths.
The respective armies and their composite nature are adequately covered, except for the number issues where some of the author’s choices and beliefs are somewhat questionable. Another questionable point is the author’s presentation of the devastating effects of massed horse archery. I have no doubt that a particular modern Hungarian horse archer expert is able, on his own and under optimal conditions, to fire six arrows in ten seconds. However, generalising this and assuming that ten to fifteen thousand Hun archers on a battlefield could all do the same is a leap of faith, to see the least. This does not imply that Hunnic arrow storms were anything else than deadly. It only means that the frequency of shooting under battle conditions with thousands of galloping horses would have been considerably less than the maximum frequency presented by the author.
Then there is the description of the campaign leading up to the battle, which I found particularly good because it addresses many of the myths built up over time regarding this invasion. The first good point is that this “invasion” was in reality a huge raid with the main motivation being plunder and destruction, as opposed to conquest.
The second excellent point was that Attila’s army, because it was essentially living on the land, could not afford to get bogged down in lengthy sieges. If a town could not be carried at the first assault or, at most, after a few days, it had to be bypassed. As the author shows rather well, it is this, more than any divinely inspired intervention, which allowed a number of towns and cities to be spared. In some cases, as also shown, the towns and their respective bishops agreed to resupply the Huns in exchange of having their lands and lives spared. This suited Attila perfectly and was the case at Troyes.
Another interesting discussion is that about the first clash at Orleans. Here the author disputes the traditional and somewhat implausible and overly dramatic narrative that the Romano-Gothic army arrived and saved the town just when it was about to fall. Instead, he describes an alternative scenario whereby the Romano-Gothic army may have been entrenched and waiting for the Huns to arrive and fight a battle under unfavourable conditions. Rather than oblige, Attila staged a retreat and drew his pursuers on ground – the Catalaunian Fields - which was much more suitable to the king of cavalry battle that he wanted to fight.
A further discussion is about identifying the exact site of the battle and, in particular, whether it took place near Ch�lons (the battle is sometimes called the battle of Ch�lons) or slightly north of Troyes, which is some eighty kilometres south of Ch�lons. In summarising the scholarly discussions that have taken place on this issue for well over a century, the author provides several elements of circumstantial evidence which tend to point towards the latter, although there is no absolute certainty.
Finally, there is the description of the battle itself. While this is largely reconstructed because of the above mentioned source deficiencies, the narrative once again is largely plausible. The battle was clearly hard fought. Attila and his Huns almost broke through the Romano-Gothic centre. The charge of the Visigoth cavalry on the right wing did deliver a decisive blow to the extent that it stopped the Hun onslaught and forced them back. However, the Roman cavalry on the left wing (or, more accurately, the cavalry under Roman command) must also have outflank their opponents and charged, although Jordanes remains totally silent. The narrative also makes clear that the Huns and their allies were beaten, but far from crushed. It also explains the reasons for not resuming the battle the next day and why Aetius let Attila retreat to the Rhine with his battered force.
The aftermath section contains a rapid assessment of what Aetius’ achieved by defeating Attila. It also mentions the next less than fully successful invasion which took place the next year against Italy. In both cases, this section, while not bad, felt a bit “rushed” and compressed, as if the author was somewhat running out of authorised space. However, the bit on the battlefield today and the various museums in the region where multiple pieces of equipment can be found are pretty good. The bibliography is also quite good, except that two recent titles are strangely missing from it. One is a title on the rule of child Emperors in the West whose absence may be explained because it is not directly related to the topic covered by the author. The author omission, however, is strange, because Hughes (excellent) biography of Aetius (Attila’s Nemesis) is of course very much spot on.
Finally, there are the illustrations. There are only three plates, although two of these are double pages. One of them, the last moments of the Burgundian King Gundicharius pierced with arrows but still fighting as he is about to be transfixed by the lance of a Hun horseman, is particularly dramatic. The illustration of Prince Thorismund haranguing his Gothic heavy cavalry as they are just about to deliver the decisive charge is just as impressive in a slightly different genre. In addition, the text is well supported by a good supply of maps, drawings and photos of equipment (some superb helmets for instance). For all this, I believe this title is worth four stars, despite the few glitches mentioned.
12 of 13 people found the following review helpful.
Best Book Available on this Crucial Battle
By J. Groen
This is an excellent, well written and researched book on this very important but little known battle. The book handles all aspects of the battle very well, from the identification of who fought and led each side, the numbers (which is a very accurate assessment) to an excellent analysis of where the battle was fought.
Regarding the last item - where the battle was fought, the author analyzes three locations, discusses the pros and cons of each, using primary and secondary sources, and arrives at a very logical conclusion - approximately five miles west of Troyes, France. From this location, and using primary and secondary sources, he very effectively lays out how the battle most likely progressed.
I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the Roman Empire. This is the best book out there on the battle of the Catalaunian Fields.
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful.
A good narrative of the campaign.
By Stone Dog
Another solid campaign book from Osprey. In "Catalaunian Fields AD 451", Simon MacDowall covers "Rome's last great battle" according to the subtitle. It's your usual Osprey title with a good summary of a campaign, maps, excellent photos and color plates.
I think the author does a pretty good job with this title. Oddly enough, the battles we're looking at were mainly fought by "barbarians" and commanded by barbarians Attila and Aetius, yet this is "Rome's" last great battle? The author gives a short, but effective summary of the background and run-up to the battle as well as both sides' movements to contact.
Despite a paucity of evidence and a dearth of written accounts, I think the author did, for the most part, a good job of using his own familiarization with this period to fill in many blanks. His sections on the opposing commanders, available forces as well as their weapons, armor and tactics seemed very good to me. His narrative of the battle, using the written sources and his own intuition, seemed very plausible to me.
Another thing: the photos of the probable battle field as well as the maps are quite good. I would also like to say that Peter Dennis did another excellent job with the color plates - excellent illustrations. He's one of the best Osprey has.
The things I didn't like are the assertions the author makes with absolutely no evidence whatsoever to go on. According to legend, St. Lupus, the bishop of Troyes, convinced Attila to leave the town be. The author then tells the reader that the good bishop actually had agreed to give Attila all the supplies and foodstuffs he needed to continue his campaign. The author makes this up out of whole cloth and continues to reference his fiction several more times later in the book. The author, like most politically correct people today, refuses to acknowledge that this was indeed a decisive battle in history - as if there wouldn't have been any difference at all had Attila and the Huns controlled much of Europe.
Despite the negatives, there's a lot of good here and I give this Osprey title four stars.
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